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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NICK CHOURNOS, I 
Plaintiff and A_ppellarit, \ 
• .
vs. ( 
LESTER BELL, D. B. STRINGHAM,( 
ARLEN BELL AND ~ 
MELVIN BROWN, J 
Defendants and Respondents. .' 
Case No. 
11079 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendanits were sued for 'villf ul trespass for travel-
ing on roads traversing plaintiff's land connecting the 
public highway and the National Forest. Plaintiff sought 
compensatory and punitive damages and injuctive relief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Judge found that the Davenport road was a public 
thoroughfare and defendants travel on it was not a tres-
pass. However, their travel on the Buck Springs Road 
(called Ridge Road by plaintiff in his brief) was a trespass. 
Damages were assessed at $10.00 nominal and contrary 
to plaintiff's assertion in his brief, he was awarded costs. 
l 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmation of that part of the Court's 
Judgment declaring Davenport Road public and holding 
that plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages; and re-
versal of that part which holds that the Buck Springs Road 
is private and assess damages and costs agai~st the de-
fendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For several years defendants and the public had access 
road to the Cache National Forest in the Buck Springs area 
from Utah Highway 39 across land owned by plaintiff. 
The access consists of ::i dirt road which divides to become 
the Davenport Canyon Road and the Buck Springs Road. 
This is the only vehicular way into Buck Springs. It has 
been used over the years by hunters, campers, picknicers, 
sight seers, forest officials, State Fish and Game personnel 
and stockmen. The use has heen without restriction of any 
kind. In 1965 for the first time, plaintiff caused a 'no 
trespassing' sign to be erected, and a cable placed across 
the road. Defendants believing the roads to be public went 
around the cable and traveled as before. On this occasion, 
they were informed by plaintiff that the roads were private. 
The following year, 1966, after conferring with a Forest 
::3ervice official and an official of State Fish and Game ~nd 
receiving the information that the roads were public, they 
once again travelled these roads going in on Davenport 
and returning on Buck Springs. This trip in 1966 resulted 
in the instant law suit. Plaintiff admits the public use of 
the roads, but complains about interference with his 
sheep business by hunters afoot and in vehicles. Most of the 
complaints are direoted to persons on his property off of 
the roads in question and serve as justification for closing 
Dll of his land to hunting. Defendants assert that the roads 
traversed have been and are now "public thoroughfares". 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT THE DAVENPORT CANYON ROAD 
WAS PUBLIC. BUT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE BUCK SPRINGS ROAD PRIVATE. 
The National Forest is available to the public for its 
highest and be~t use including timber production, grazing, 
hunting, camping and general public recreation (T 138, 
139). The only reasonable access and the only vehicular 
access to the Buck Springs area is over the roads in ques-
tion (T 12). The plaintiff Nick Chournos testified (T 101) : 
"Q : Is there any other access by vehicle? 
A: There isn't. The Forest Service wants them to go 
in there, they can take a bulldozer up there and fix 
them a road. They don't have to go through me. 
Q: Is there any other access by motor vehicle down 
into Buck Springs other than across this road that 
traverses section 27? 
A: I just got through telling you they come up from 
the west side in the Buck Springs area. 
Q : By motor vehicle? 
A : Yes, sir. Not on top of the Buck Springs, but onto 
the hill to the west. 
Q: Can they get into Buck Springs? 
A: Not with a car." 
all year around ( T 73) . There was just too many hunter!\. 
Everywhere you looked there was a hunter (T 106). 
There's been thousands of them stuck (T 108). 
The use was unrestricted (T 52) until 1965. No per-
mission was asked or granted. Plaintiff "let them go hunt-
ing until - - - (63 or 64) - - - when we decided to close 
it (T 72) ." 
The plaintiff's son, Samuel N. Chournos, testified 
as follows: (T 114) 
Q : Well you tell me what happened. That's all I want 
to know, is what happened. 
A: Sixty-four is the first year we closed our property 
to hunting. We published it in the paper, we done 
everything we could. We notified our personal friends 
and relatives that it 'M:ts closed, that there would be 
no hunting or no trespassing in the area. Prior ti 
that time we let anyone hunt in the area in the regular 
season. 
Q: Anyone at all that wanted to trtavel across and 
go on these roads, you had no objection to? 
A: No. 
Q: In other words, it wasn't just a situation where 
only those you invited came on ; the general public 
came across? 
A: Right. 
Q : And for how many years did that go on? 
A : As long 1as I've been up there. 
Q : And how long has that been ? 
A: All my life. 
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Clark Anderson, retired Forest Ranger with many years 
experience in this area stated there was no other access 
except by the road in question ( T 155). 
The Davenport Canyon Road appeared as a trail on 
a survey approved by the surveyor General on February 
22, 1879 (Exhibit 18). The Buck Springs Road apparently 
was in existence in 1925 (T 93, 94). Most of the evidence 
as to use applied to both roads. They were used by Mr. 
Chournos from 1925 when he pulled his camp down with 
a wagon and team of horses (T 93, 94). Also, in the early 
days use was made by saddle and pack horses. The public 
h:as driven across for many years (T 98). In 1932, Frank 
Frazer had his camp wagon at Buck Springs. Clark Ander-
son has taken his sedan over both of the roads since 1936, 
and has observed constant use of them since 1932 (T 152) 
by hunters and others (T 153) (T 160). Roy Stoker used 
both roads 15 or 16 years\ago (T 172, 173). The defendant, 
Lester Bell, has used the roads for the last 11 years (T 183, 
184) with his party; Lamar D. Hansen and his party since 
1940. They appear on the forest service system of roads as 
existing rqads (T 122) and are shown in existence by 
aerial photos taken in 1952 (Exhibit 19). The record 
establishes constant use by the public long in excess of 10 
years. 
The following are statements made by the plaintiff's 
witnesses: 
Hundreds of hunters in 1964 (T 23). Hunting people 
increased over a hundred fold (T 36). A hundred cars 
would be going down in the day time (T 44). Heavy in-
flux of hunters for 10 yearSI (T 52). The road has been 
there as long as Robert Whiteny can remember (T 66). 
Hunting in the area since 1925 (T 72). They are hunting 
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Q: Well, what are yon'? About 28 or 29? 
A: Thirty-five. 
Q : Are you? And your recollection would go back 
to when, about ten or something? 
A : Well, not in the deer season. I would have been 
there since I was about sixteen. 
Defendants did not damage the land of plaintiff 
(T 97) 1and traveled on the roads in good faith believing 
them to be public (T 13, 14, 15, 31, 188 and 204). There 
was no evidence of wilful and malicious trespass 
Apparently the plaintiff's. land where these roads are 
located was public domain until 1925 (T 93). The area 
was not reserved 1as National Forest land until 1937 (T 130). 
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, et al, 101 U 1, 116 P 2, 420 
(1941) referring to Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. 
Chournos, 75 Utah 304, 385, 285 P 646, 647 (1921) 
states: 
"By act of Congress passed in 1866, Revised 
Statutes US. Sec. 2477 (re USCA Sec 932), provided: 
'The right of way for the construction of high· 
ways over public lands, not reserved for public 
uses is hereby granted' 
,By this act' said the Court in Streeter v 
Stainaker, 61 Neb. 205, 85 NW 47, 48, 'the govern· 
ment consented that any of its lands not reserved 
for a public purpose might be taken and used for 
public roads The statute was a standing offer of 
a free right of way over the public domain, and as 
soon as it was accepted in an appropriate manner 
by the agellJts of the public, or the public itself, a 
highway was established.' 
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"It has been held Ly numerous courts that the grant 
may be accepted by public use without former action by 
public authorities, and that continued use of the road by 
the public for such length of time and under such circum-
stances as to clearly indicate 1an intention on the part of 
the public to accept the grant is sufficient ... " 
The following Utah Code provisions apply: 
27-12-89, UC.A., 1953, as amended: 
"Public use constituting dedication - - A highway 
shall be deemed to have been dedicated and aban-
doned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period of ten years." 
27-12-90, U.C.A, 1953, as amended: 
Highways once established continue until aban-
doned - - All public highways once e3tablished shall 
continue to be highways until abandoned or vac-
ated by order of the highway authorities having 
jurisdiction over any such highway, or by other 
competent authority." 
Boyer v. Clark, May 2, 1958, 7 U (2d) 394, 326 P 
2d 107 involved a wagon trail from State Highway 133 
over a ridge into Grass Creek. It was held in that case that 
the evidence was sufficient to establish a highway by 
dedication because the public, even though not consisting 
of a great many persons, made a continuous and uninter-
rupted use of the road as often as they found it convenient 
and necessary. 
Clark v. Erekson, 9 Ut 2d 212, 341 P pd 424 (Ju/
11 
8, 1959). The evidence in this case showed use of the lan~ 
by walking or riding in wagons, and later on, in auto. 
mobiles by people going to fish in Little Cottonwood 
Creek. There was no evidence thiat permission was sought 
or given. It was held that this was sufficient to establish 
a dedication of the road by user. 
The Jeremy v. Bertagnole case, supra, found that the 
road used by the public generally for all necessary and 
convenient purposes, including pedestrian, vehicular and 
equestrain traffic, and trailing of cattle, horses and sheep, 
for more than sixty years was, a public road or highway. 
Lindsay Land & Lii•estock Co. v. Chournos, at al, Oct. 
1, 1929, 285, P 646 is similar in many aspects to the instant 
case. 
"The lands over which the highway is claimed are 
unenclosed and uninhabited mountain lands, suit-
able only for grazing purposes, and situated near 
the southern border of Cache County. The road 
extends across the lands in a general easterly and 
westerly direction following a part of its distance 
throug'h ·a narrow canyon or pass called Daven-
port Canyon. At the eastern terminus of the road 
is a large area of mountain land valuable for 
grazing animal~ in the summer season, a portion 
of which is now the Cache National Forest, and a 
portion of which is private ownership. This area 
has been extensively used for summer grazing for 
many years by owners of sheep Who trailed them 
over the route in question from the settled por-
tions of the county lying to west, to the summer 
range in the spring of the year and back again in 
the fall. 
"It is contended, however, that the use of the road, 
as proved, was not such as amounted to a continu-
ous and uninterrupted use as a public thoroughfare. 
And in this connection it is argued that the uses 
made of the road for sawmill and mining purposes 
were of a temporary character, and the use of it 
for trailing sheep was infrequeunt and occasional 
and over an uncertain course. 
" ..... While it is difficult to fix a standard by 
which to measure what is a public use or a public 
thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was 
used by many and diff erenrt persons for a variety 
of purposes; that it was open to all who desired 
to use it; that the use made of it was as general 
and extensive as the situation and surroundingR 
would permit, had the road been formally laid out 
as a public highway by public authority. We 
therefore conclude that the Court was justified in 
finding that the roadi had been continuously and 
uninterruptedly used as a public thoroughfare for 
more than ten years." 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence establishes the Buck Springs Road and 
Davenport Canyon Road are public and that no trespass 
occurred. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LaVAR E. STARK 
of Alsup 'and Stark 
3755 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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